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Perspective Piece
The Year That Ebola Virus Took Over West Africa: Missed Opportunities for Prevention
Daniel G. Bausch*
Tulane School of Public Health and Tropical Medicine, Department of Tropical Medicine, New Orleans, Louisiana;
US Naval Medical Research Unit No. 6, Virology and Emerging Infections Department, Lima, Peru
I will always remember 2014 as the year that Ebola virus
took over west Africa and thus, much of my time and life. The
epicenters of the outbreak in Guinea and Sierra Leone are
areas that I have worked in since 1996 on projects to build
capacity to combat another viral hemorrhagic disease, Lassa
fever, with the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
(CDC), World Health Organization (WHO), Tulane Univer-
sity, and others. I spent a lot time and made many friends and
colleagues in the Forest Region of Guinea and the Kenema
District of Sierra Leone, both at the heart of this Ebola out-
break. I have also responded to quite a few Ebola andMarburg
virus outbreaks over the years. Therefore, it was natural that,
when Ebola hit west Africa, I would get involved. Indeed, since
April of 2014, it has pretty much been all Ebola all of the time,
with me cycling constantly between my home in Lima, Peru
and west Africa, Geneva, and Washington, consulting primar-
ily with the WHO and the US Government.
It was in June in Kenema that the outbreak started to
become increasingly personal; it seemed that almost every
day another healthcare worker who was part of our Kenema
Lassa (now Ebola) team who I had been working with for
decades, some who I had even recruited, including the now
sadly famous Dr. Sheik Humarr Khan,1 was coming down
with a fever, testing positive for Ebola, and becoming a case
rather than a caregiver. It was like some surrealistic night-
mare—“I dreamt that an Ebola outbreak hit Kenema, and
everyone I knew was getting infected and dying.” A few
months later, the dream-like quality extended to the United
States, with imported cases, occasional secondary transmission,
and much public panic.
Pretty much every day since then, the persistent question,
one that countless journalists have asked me, has been “how
did this happen?” The public health corollary of the question,
how I ask it to myself, is “how could this all have been
prevented?” Journalists focus on the big picture and short
term: what might governments and international organiza-
tions have done differently over the last 10 months? These
are valid questions, but with such close ties to the region and
people, I cannot help but personalize and deepen the ques-
tion. What might have been done differently in my projects
in the region over the past 10 years that could have helped
avert this humanitarian disaster? I suppose that there is some
arrogant-sounding “I told you so” in the answers, but the
accusation is just as often directed at myself. Boiling it all
down, I see at least five areas of missed opportunity that
might have made a difference.
BUILDING ANDMAINTAINING DIAGNOSTIC
LABORATORY AND OUTBREAK
RESPONSE CAPACITY
In 2004, the WHO, Tulane University, the Mano River
Union country (Guinea, Sierra Leone, and Liberia) govern-
ments, and various collaborators and funders established
the Mano River Union Lassa Fever Network (MRU-LFN) to
assist “in the development of national and regional prevention
and control strategies for Lassa fever and other dangerous
diseases, including the enhancement of laboratory diagnostic
capacity, and training in laboratory diagnosis, clinical manage-
ment, and infection and environmental control.”2 The corner-
stone of the project was enhancement of laboratory capacity.
Although the initial focus was Kenema, the project was also to
enhance capacity in existing laboratories in Monrovia, Liberia;
Conakry, Guinea; and most pertinent now, N’Ze´re´kore´,
Guinea (Figure 1). The N’Ze´re´kore´ laboratory, just a few
hours away from the Gue´cke´dou region, where Ebola virus
apparently was introduced into humans to start the terrible
west African outbreak,3 was created during my time working
on Lassa fever with the CDC. We eventually discovered that
the incidence of Lassa fever and thus, the potential for research
was much less in Guinea than in Sierra Leone.4 Enthusiasm for
the project waned, and 2002 was the last year of the CDC
funding. The resources of the MRU-LFN were never sufficient
to carry the load in any laboratory other than Kenema, and by
2010, the MRU-LFN had lost much of its steam. Without any
real support from the Guinean government or an international
benefactor, the N’Ze´re´kore´ laboratory’s capacity slowly faded.
Could Ebola virus, which was identified as the source of the
outbreak in laboratories in France and Germany in March of
2014,3 3 months after the first introduction in Gue´cke´dou,
have been identified months earlier if the laboratory capacity
had existed just down the road in N’Ze´re´kore´?
The MRU-LFN did have some success; excellent labora-
tory infrastructure was established in Kenema that has proven
very valuable in providing Lassa and since the onset of this
outbreak, Ebola virus diagnostics. However, the broader goal
of the MRU-LFN, to bring the three Mano River Union
countries together and give them the tools to mount a coordi-
nated and comprehensive public health response, was sadly
never realized—what seems now to be a glaring and tragic
missed opportunity.
STRIKING THE RESEARCH-TO-PATIENT
CARE BALANCE
Starting in 2005, Tulane University and partners began
receiving considerable funding from the US National Institutes
of Health (NIH) for Lassa fever projects based out of Kenema
primarily focused on developing diagnostics and understanding
cellular mechanisms and disease pathogenesis. Although these
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projects led to considerable upgrades in the laboratory infra-
structure as well as advances in our understanding of Lassa
fever, NIH funding restrictions left little room to support
patient care. I always felt bad when comparing the shiny new
research and diagnostics laboratory at Kenema Government
Hospital with the dilapidated, cramped, and poorly resourced
Lassa ward only some 50 m away (Figure 2). Considerations of
building a new Lassa ward have been ongoing for over a decade
and have even led to ground breaking and initial phases of
construction promoted and sponsored at times by the European
Union, theWHO, and theUSDepartment of Defense. However,
each time, some logistical demon raised its head—contractors
had insufficient capital, budgets were frozen, funds were lost,
and key personnel changed. The unfinished shell of the new ward
in Kenema still sits collecting rain, a testament to good intentions
betrayed by the logistical, bureaucratic, and financial complexities
of the world of development, although there are plans now to
finally finish it off. There were also periodic discussions with
Medecins Sans Frontieres-Belgium, which had a malaria project
in a neighboring district, about taking over the running of the
Kenema Lassa ward, but nothing ever materialized. How much
better and safer might Ebola care have been in Kenema if these
projects were seen through to completion?
TRAINING
Through the course of the MRU-LFN program and related
projects in Guinea and Sierra Leone, we recognized that we
needed to invest in training to create the researchers and
public health experts of the region. We chipped away at this
by hiring and training technicians and integrating as best we
could with the local governments. We created a 2-week mas-
ters’ level course in public health and tropical medicine held
each summer in Kenema in collaboration with the Kenema
Eastern Polytechnic University. This offered the innovative
feature of pairing Sierra Leonean (at drastically reduced
tuition) and American students to expand their mutual aca-
demic as well as cultural horizons. A handful of Tulane stu-
dents would spend summers in Kenema working on various
research and public health projects, and we would occasion-
ally find the resources to bring a Sierra Leonean or Guinean
collaborator to the United States to visit Tulane and attend a
scientific meeting.
However, these were small steps. Real progress could only
be made through larger, more comprehensive training pro-
grams to provide the doctoral-level foundation required to
develop leaders in the health sciences. We wrote some train-
ing grant applications here and there submitted to the US
Agency for International Development (USAID), the World
Bank, and others but had no luck. Major challenges in finding
and creating training opportunities included the generally
high cost of tuition in the United States, limited English fluency
of candidates (especially in francophone Guinea), constant
personnel changes in the Ministries of Health and Education
of the west African countries, and far-from-intuitive or user-
friendly processes for taking the test of English as a foreign
language (TOEFL) or graduate record exam (GRE) or iden-
tifying training opportunities through US Embassies. I am
Figure 1. Map of the Mano River Union countries (Sierra Leone, Guinea, and Liberia) showing the total number of cases of Ebola virus
disease for each region (key) and the approximate known endemic area for Lassa fever (dotted oval line). Sites of the four laboratories included in
the Mano River Union Lassa Fever Network (MRU-LFN) are indicated by black stars: Kenema, Sierra Leone; Monrovia, Liberia; Conakry, Guinea;
and N’Ze´re´kore´, Guinea. Gue´cke´dou, Guinea, where the Ebola outbreak is thought to have begun, is indicated by a red star. Adapted from the Ebola
Response Road Map, December 17, 2014, World Health Organization and Khan et al.2
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somewhat ashamed to admit that we have not, to date, suc-
ceeded in enrolling one of our African colleagues in a doctoral-
level training program.
There were also missed opportunities on the American
side; one particularly strong “I told you so” reflection is a
2010 proposal entitled “Training in Patient Management and
Clinical Research on Biosafety Level Four Pathogens” sub-
mitted to the Western Regional Centers of Excellence
(WRCE) in Galveston, TX, one of various centers created by
the NIH to support research focused on countering threats
from bioterror agents and emerging infectious diseases. Rec-
ognizing the dearth of physicians in the United States with
experience in the clinical management of viral hemorrhagic
fevers, we proposed to rotate US clinicians through the
Kenema Lassa fever ward to provide valuable clinical experi-
ences for visiting Americans and hosting Sierra Leoneans
alike, while improving the quality of patient care. Although
the protocol received very favorable reviews and was recom-
mended for funding by the WRCE, the NIH saw things differ-
ently and pulled the plug before we got started.
A FOCUS ON PATIENT CARE AND FIELD
RESEARCH ON DRUGS AND VACCINES
This outbreak has brought to the forefront the issue of
improving care for the individual patient with Ebola virus
disease, including the complex challenge of field-testing drugs
and vaccines. However, the matter is not new; in 2006, a group
of filovirus experts met in Winnipeg, Canada at a meeting
entitled “Marburg and Ebola Hemorrhagic Fever: Feasibility
of Prophylaxis and Therapy.” Various manuscripts published
in the meeting’s wake called for a refocusing on individual
patient care,5 a byproduct of which would be a better under-
standing of disease pathogenesis, and charting out a course for
clinical testing of drugs and vaccines during outbreaks.6 How-
ever, there was not much action afterward. Although this
meeting and the subsequent publications can hardly be con-
sidered a panacea for the present challenges in west Africa, it
is hard to believe that we would not be farther down the road
toward a solution if more concerted steps had been taken
toward the advocated strategies.
ENHANCING INFECTION CONTROL AT KENEMA
GOVERNMENT HOSPITAL
To date, 24 (89%) of 27 healthcare workers working in the
Ebola ward in Kenema have contracted Ebola virus, 19 of
them fatally (case fatality rate = 80%), revealing the dismal
state of infection prevention and control (IPC) at Kenema
Government Hospital. However, realization that IPC needed
significant shoring up did not start with the new Ebola out-
break. Numerous healthcare workers contracted Lassa virus
in the Lassa ward over the years, including its former chief.7
In 2007, a nurse studying for her Masters of Public Health
(MPH) degree at Tulane spent a summer in Kenema doing an
IPC assessment of the hospital, working with a very capable
Sierra Leonean staff nurse. Many IPC shortcomings were iden-
tified, about which the Sierra Leonean nurse was enthusiastic
and diligent in his desire to remedy. On more than one occa-
sion, he submitted a small budget to address some of the issues,
but other research priorities always superseded compounded by
the fact that there was no funding line from research grants to
address IPC issues. Little ever came of it. Howmany healthcare
worker lives could have been saved if something had?
I know that the issues discussed above are complex, that
there are always competing priorities, and that hindsight is 20/
20. I know that, in the vast majority of cases, the people
involved made the best decisions and did the best job that
they could. I know that there are no easy answers neither
looking back nor going forward. My comments are not meant
to point fingers or assign blame but rather, to provide a
degree of honest introspection that can lead to what I also
know—that we can do better and that the missed opportuni-
ties of the past 10 years must not be missed again.
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Figure 2. Healthcare workers and patients in the Kenema Gov-
ernment Hospital Lassa ward in 2005. Photos by D.G.B. and A. Wurie.
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